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As part of the 2017 Audit of UK Democracy , Patrick Dunleavy and DA staff  examine how democratic the two big
reformed electoral systems used in the UK – the ‘Additional Members System (AMS)’ and the ‘Supplementary Vote
(SV)’ are, and how successful they have been in showing the way for more modern electoral systems under British
political conditions.
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What does democracy require for an electoral system?
It should accurately translate parties’ votes into seats in the legislature (e.g. Parliament)
In a way that is recognised as legitimate by most citizen (ideally almost all of them).
No substantial part of the population should regard the result as illegitimate, nor suffer a
consistent bias of the system ‘working against them’.
If possible, the system should have beneficial effects for the good governance of the country.
If possible, the voting system should enhance the social representativeness of the legislature,
and encourage high levels of voting across all types of citizens.
Since 1999 voting systems in the UK have diversified. The first Blair government, with Liberal Democrat co-
operation, created proportional Additional Member Systems (AMS) between 1998-2000 for new devolved bodies in
Scotland, Wales and London. These will have their fifth round of elections in May 2016. Labour also set up the
successful London Mayor system, and since 2010 Conservative ministers have encouraged ‘strong mayor’ elections
elsewhere, further expanding the use of a second ‘Supplementary Vote’ (SV) system.
‘Additional Member’ Systems in Scotland, Wales and London
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Used for: choosing MSPs in the Scottish Parliament, AMs in the Welsh National Assembly and
members of the Greater London Assembly (GLA).
How it works: In ‘classic’ versions of AMS (used in Germany and New Zealand) half of the members
of these bodies are locally elected in constituencies using first-past-the-post’, FPTP voting. The
remaining half (the ‘additional’ or ‘top up’ members) are elected in larger regional areas, where a
whole set of seats are allocated using a proportional representation system – so as to make parties’
seat shares match their vote shares as accurately as possible. Voters cast two ballots: one for their
constituency representative, and one for their top-up region representative.
In ‘British AMS’, because constituency representation was seen as historically and culturally important in the UK,
there are more local constituency seats than top-up seats. In Wales though, the proportion of top-up seats (at 1/3) is
sometimes too small to ensure proportional outcomes, if one party is heavily over-represented in the constituency
seats. In Scotland and Wales the top-up areas are sub-regions. For the Greater London Assembly the top-up area is
the whole of London. 
Body Local seats Top-up seats Total seats
Scottish Parliament 73 (57%) 56 (43%) 129
Welsh National Assembly 40 (67%) 20 (33%)  60
Greater London Assembly 14 (56%) 11 (44%)  25
Voters get two ballot papers, one for their local constituency and one for the wider regional contest, and they mark
one X vote on each paper. The local constituencies use FPTP, so whoever gets the largest vote in each local area is
the winner.
In AMS voters also have a second vote for their regional top-up members. To decide who gets top up seats, each
party puts forward a slate of candidates (their ‘list), and voters choose one party to support. We look at how many
local seats a party already has within region A from the local contests, and what share of the list votes it has in the A
region. If a party already has its full share of seats, it gets none of the top-up members. But if the party does not
have enough seats already it is assigned additional members, taken from its list of candidates, so as to bring each
party as closely as possible to having equal percentages of seats and votes (for the top-up area stage).
There’s a formula for doing this that works near perfectly given large top-up areas. However, it may over-represent
larger parties if a lot of the list vote is split across multiple smaller parties, which tends to happen quite a lot in
British AMS elections.
Recent developments
A key rationale for the three AMS systems is to offer proportional representation for each of the bodies involved. In
evaluating this claim it is worth bearing in mind as a benchmark the Westminster electoral system’s deviation from
proportionality, which is 22.5% (see our Audit on FPTP). Table 1 below shows that the Scottish AMS system has
performed twice as well in terms of matching party seats shares with their vote shares, and the London system has
fared almost as well. In Wales DV scores are higher, because there have been too few top-up seats, especially in
2007. But still, on average, DV scores are routinely two thirds of UK general election scores.
Table 1: The deviation from proportionality (DV score) of British AMS elections
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Note: The DV score shows the percent of
representatives not entitled to their seats in terms of
their party’s share of the overall vote. Its practical
minimum level is c.5%.
Proportional voting systems tend to produce coalition
or minority governments, unless some party can
command a clear majority of votes on its own. Table 2
shows that the AMS systems have only delivered one single-party government outcome, when the SNP won an
outright majority in Edinburgh in 2011, following a period when they ran a minority government (2007-11). In May
2016 the SNP looks certain to win another outright majority. In Wales Labour has been continuously in government,
but has never had an outright majority. This pattern looks likely to continue in 2016. In London the Assembly has
never had a majority party of the same party as the Mayor. The 2016 result for the GLA is harder to predict, but
Tories and Labour may be quite evenly matched. The arrangements for forming governments have generally fared
well in all three bodies, without prolonged uncertainty and with party divisions generally not being rancorous.
Table 2: Governing outcomes of the Additional Member System elections
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
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Strengths Weaknesses
The AMS systems were purpose-designed for all
three bodies. The Edinburgh system was defined by
a constitutional convention, and the GLA system by
political scientist consultants. The Cardiff
arrangements, however, were a political ‘fix’ decided
by the Welsh Labour party.
It is simple for citizens to vote for a local
representative. Some critics predicted that citizens
would see constituency voting under AMS as more
important than top-up votes; and in the 2000 London
elections one in six voters did not use their List vote.
However, by 2008 and 2012 more people voted in
the top-up election than in the constituency stage.
AMS is easy to count, and it is straightforward for
voters to understand how the overall result
happened. All outcomes have had high levels of
public acceptance and legitimacy.
Election results for all three bodies have been more
proportional than for Westminster elections (see
above).
Turnout levels have been highest in Scotland at 49
to 59%. Wales has averaged 43%. London turnout
grew from 33% in 2000 to 45% in 2008, falling back
a bit since, but still high for local elections.
Under AMS, parties have incentives to put equal
numbers of men and women on their top-up lists.
Somewhat more representatives are women than in
the Commons, with 35% of the Scottish Parliament,
36% of the London Assembly and 40% of Welsh
National Assembly female members.
Back in 1998-2000 some MPs and Tory critics
warned that having two types of representatives
would lead to local representatives being seen as far
more legitimate and connected to voters than those
from top-up areas. In fact, there has been no
evidence of adverse effects on the legitimacy or
public visibility of the top-up area representatives.
We noted above the shortage of top-up seats
in Wales, which explains higher DV scores
here, especially in strong Labour years.
In London the Assembly has only 25
members, so every seat-switch between
parties reallocates 4% of the total. So this is
not a ‘fine-grain’ measure of party support.
London’s DV score is also a bit higher
because by law no party can win a top-up
seat unless they get 5% of the London-wide
(list) vote.
The detailed counting rule used to allocate
top-up seats (called the d’Hondt rule)
somewhat favours the one or two largest
parties in all three cases. As in any electoral
system, votes going to very small parties
(below say 3% of the total) are unlikely to
secure any representation – and in London
cannot do so.
The systems do not seem to have improved
the representation of ethnic minorities or of
people from manual backgrounds.
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Opportunities for positive change Future Threats
There are some reform demands to
create more top-up members in the
Welsh National Assembly, which is like
to make results more proportional.
Over the 17 years it has been
operating, the Scottish Parliament has
gained far greater autonomy over more
public spending and attracted high
levels of public trust. Wales and
Greater London are also pressing
Whitehall for their powers to increase,
and they have broad public support for
such a change on their areas.
As these bodies become more
significant and permenant in the eyes
of citizens, voters’ interest, turnout
levels and media coverage may all
increase, especially in Scotland.
Both Scotland and Wales are unicameral legislatures, so
there is no upper house to constrain the behaviour of a
party that becomes dominant there.
The SNP has emerged as a ‘dominant party’ in Scotland ,
especially since the 2014 referendum. There have been
complaints of overly strong/unchecked executive rule by
the party. These concerns may strengthen if the SNP wins
another overall majority in 2016. However, there are no
regional ‘electoral deserts’ in Scotland without multi-party
representation. And no electoral system can ensure more
diversity of parties than citizens have voted for.
The Supplementary Vote for electing executive Mayors and Police Commissioners
Used for: choosing the Mayor of London; executive mayors in 16 English local authorities , mainly
large cities; and choosing all Police Commissioners in England and Wales. From 2017 onwards SV
will also be used to elect ‘regional’ executive mayors in six major areas outside London.
How it works: No election for a powerful executive position (such as a mayor or president) can
operate in a proportional way, because the single office cannot be divided between parties. Instead
the Supplementary Vote system tries to involve as many voters as possible in deciding on the winner.
Voters have a ballot paper with two columns on it, one for their first choice and one for their second choice. They put
an X vote against their chosen candidate in the first preference column, and then (if they wish) an X also in the
second preference column.
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The key difference between the SV and FPTP sytems
is what candidates must do to get elected, as the
system is designed to make leading candidates ‘reach
out’ to voters outside their own party’s ranks.. At the
start first preference votes only are counted. If anyone
has more than 50% at this stage then they are elected
straightaway, and counting ends.
However, if no one has overall majority support, then
the top two candidates go into a runoff stage on their
own, where the second preference ballot papers of
eliminated candidates are checked. Second choice
votes for one of the two candidates still in the race are
added to their piles. Once all relevant second votes are
added in, whoever of the two top candidates has the
most votes overall is the winner.
This process of knocking out all the low-ranked
candidates at once, and redistributing their voters’ second choices, ensures that the largest feasible number of votes
count in deciding who is elected. The person elected can only be one of the initial top two runners (unlike the
Alternative Vote, rejected at the 2011 referendum). And yet in practical terms they always have a majority of eligible
votes cast. In repeated London elections, there has been nearly three fifths support for the winner.
Recent developments
The supplementary vote was first approved has been used four times to elect the London mayor, in around 30
contests for other mayors, and in the 2012 elections of Police and Crime Commissioners. Table 1 shows that almost
10 million votes have now been cast using the system. In London over four fifths of voters take the opportunity to
give both a first and a second preference vote. Turnout levels in London also rose from just over a third in 2000 to
peak at over 45% in 2008.
Table 1: Major elections held under the Supplementary Vote from 2000
By contrast, the first Police Commissioner elections in 2012 were poorly run. They were held in November, at a cold
time of year, with little advertising and separate from normal local elections– resulting in a 15% turnout. There was
little publicity about the new positions or the candidates, and large numbers voters were using SV for the first time.
Yet, even so, just under two thirds of voters cast a second preference , and the results were accepted as a sound
reflection of the views of those voting.
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A possible key problem of the Supplementary Vote concerns whether voters can accurately identify who the top two
candidates are in advance, so as to use their second preference vote effectively. If a voter does not use either of
their preferences for one of the top two candidates then their input does not determine who wins.The London Mayor
election has always been well forecast and Table 2 shows that even in the first 2000 election the proportion of
effective votes was over three quarters. As voters learnt more about how the system worked that proportion has
increased to over 11 out of every 12 votes. Thus SV in London has indeed maximised the number of votes that
count.
Table 2: How voters in the London mayor election became more ‘effective’ in choosing candidates to
support
Outside London there has been a limited trend for major cities to adopt the executive major system (like Watford,
Bristol, Liverpool and Leicester), and elections there generally operate similarly to London, with Labour versus
Conservative run-off contests. However, the Labour candidate in Liverpool in 2014 won outright with 55% of the first-
preference votes.
Following devolution deals negotiated between council leaders in six areas and Conservative ministers, new
‘regional mayor’ elections are expected to be set up and begin operating in 2017 in Greater Manchester (where the
mayor will control health service and infrastructure spending), the Liverpool City Region, the North East, the
Sheffield City Region, Tees Valley and the West Midlands.
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis
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Strengths Weaknesses
A brand new system introduced first in
London in 2000, and designed by
political scientist consultants. The
system is popular with voters.
The SV system is simple for voters to
use and supporters of small parties
can express their real feelings with
their first vote, but still use their
second vote to choose which of the
top two candidates they prefer to win.
SV is straightforward to count, even at
large scale – around 2 million votes
are counted overnight in the London-
wide Mayoral contest, using electronic
counting. Voters can easily
understand how the count operated
and the result happened.
Election results for London Mayor
have shown winners getting nearly
60% of all eligible and counted votes.
The four results so far have all been
accepted as accurate, giving
incumbents of the office very high
levels of public acceptance and
legitimacy.
No major public criticisms of the
system have emerged.
Recent turnout levels in London at 40-
45% are high for local elections.
 
Some critics have argued that the person chosen may not
quite have a majority of all the votes cast. This is because
some people may give both their first and second choice
votes to smaller party candidates, who stand no chance of
being in the final top two run-off. But then no other voting
system can achieve this in practice either.
SV is like an ‘instant run-off’ version of double-ballot
elections (used e.g. in France, where if no one gets a
majority on the first ballot, voters must come back a week
later and vote again). Some critics argue that it is hard for
voters to know in advance who the top two candidates are
likely to be. But in London and most local areas this should
be reasonably clear.
English local authorities have had the chance to introduce
executive mayors since 2000, and 16 now use this system.
In three areas mayoral systems were used for a time but
then abandoned following local referenda. In 2011 voters in
nine areas turned down executive mayors in referenda
imposed on local voters.
One or two early mayoral elections saw victories for
unlikely or allegedly ‘joke’ candidates with high name
recognition. This has not persisted.
Opportunities for positive change Future Threats
The creation of new executive Mayors for Manchester,
Yorkshire and other northern English city-regions (e.g.
with powers over health spending) could improve public
knowledge of the SV system.
Some local authorities without elected mayors may also
adopt them in future.
Turnout for Police Commissioner elections should
improve significantlu when these contests are run at
the normal time of year in May 2016, especially
alongside local elections. This again may boost
public awareness of SV.
Some local authorities with an executive
mayor may still revert back to a council
system after a local referendum. But
again this is for wider reasons, not
dissatisfaction with SV.
Conclusion
All three Additional Member Systems  have operated effectively and the electoral legitimacy of governments in
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Scotland and Wales has been high. Furthermore, the representativeness of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh
National Assembly has not been questioned by the public or the media. In London the GLA elections have been
seen as fair, and its scrutiny role has secured some public profile in holding to account the executive Mayor.
The Supplementary Vote system has also proved very successful, working very effectively in London in elections
so far, and because of that also spreading out to shape the choice of more and more directly elected public officials
in England, with a high degree of non-partisan support. This is a rare case of a reformed electoral system spreading
incrementally to new bodies and policy areas.
—
This post does not represent the views of the London School of Economics or the LSE Public Policy Group.
Patrick Dunleavy is Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at the LSE, co-director of Democratic Audit and
Chair of the Public Policy Group.
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